Reported  tailings dam failures.A review of the European incidents in the worldwide context by Rico, María Teresa et al.
  1
Reported tailings dam failures. A review of the European 
incidents in the worldwide context. 
Rico, M.1; Benito, G.2, Salgueiro, A. R.3, Díez-Herrero, A.4 & Pereira, H.G.3 
 
1CSIC – Instituto Pirenaico de Ecología, Zaragoza, Spain 
2CSIC – Centro de Ciencias Medioambientales, Madrid, Spain 
3CERENA – Centro de Recursos Naturais e Ambiente of IST, Lisboa, Portugal 
4Geological Hazards Unit, Spanish Geological Survey (IGME), Madrid, Spain 
 
Corresponding author:  
Rico, M.  
e-mail: mayterico@ipe.csic.es 
Telephone: (34) 976716118 




A detailed search and re-evaluation of the known historical cases of tailings dam failure 
was carried out. A corpus of 147 cases of worldwide tailings dam disasters, from which 
26 located in Europe, was compiled in a database. This contains six sections, including 
dam location, its physical and constructive characteristics, actual and putative failure 
cause, sludge hydrodynamics, socio-economical consequences and environmental 
impacts. Europe ranks in second place in reported accidents (18%), more than one third 
of them in dams 10-20 m high. In Europe, the most common cause of failure is related 
to unusual rain, whereas there is a lack of occurrences associated with seismic 
liquefaction, which is the second cause of tailings dam breakage elsewhere in the 
World. Moreover, over 90% of incidents occurred in active mines, and only 10% refer 
to abandoned ponds. The results reached by this preliminary analysis show an urgent 
need for EU regulations regarding technical standards of tailings disposal. 
 
Keywords: Environmental hazards, Tailings dam failures, Europe, Mine Tailings, Mono 
and multi variate statistical analysis.  
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1. Introduction  
Tailings dams are supposed to last forever, but past experience shows that minor and 
major spills pose a serious environmental threat that stay behind when the mine closes. 
A number of singular characteristics makes tailings dams more vulnerable than other 
type of retention structures (e.g. water-retention type of dams), namely (1) 
embankments formed by locally collected fills (soil, coarse waste, overburden from 
mining operations and tailings); (2) dams subsequently raised as solid material coupled 
with a severe increase in effluent (plus runoff from precipitation); (3) lack of regulations 
on specific design criteria; (4) lack of dam stability requirements regarding continuous 
monitoring and control during emplacement, construction, and operation; (5) high cost 
of maintenance works for tailings dams after closure of mining activities.    
 
In Europe, public concern on the risk and potential impacts of the existing (in 
operation, inactive and abandoned) tailings dams has been growing since recent 
incidents occurred: the Aznalcóllar large scale sulphide tailings dam spill on April 25th, 
1998 [1,2,3], the Baia Mare (Romania) cyanide contaminated water released in January, 
2000 [4], the Baia Borsa (Romania) tailings contaminated by heavy minerals spill in 
March 2000 [5], and Aitik mine (Sweden) contaminated water released in September 
2000 [6,7]. These and other past experiences show that emphasis should be put on 
prevention rather than reacting after the fact. By anticipating potential risk 
considerations, environmental impact can be minimised and true costs optimised.  
 
Several investigations have attempted to summarise the causes of major tailings dam 
failures throughout the world. The most recent and comprehensive synthesis was 
performed by the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) [8] (221 tailings 
dam incidents), based on the previous database by the U.S. Commission on Large Dams 
(USCOLD) [9], gathering a large amount of information on incidents in the USA (185 
tailings dam incidents) that occurred during the period 1917-1989. This database was 
supplemented by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [10] with recent damage 
cases in USA, and by the United Nations Environmental Programme [11] (last updated 
on the 4th of March 2006), referring to the compilation of a selection of 83 major 
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tailings dam failures. The analysis of tailings dam performance provides important 
information on key design factors of dam stability [8], including in situ characteristics 
(geology, seismicity, climate, upstream catchment area), selection of embankment and 
construction sequence types, as well as hazard factors identification (heavy rain, 
flooding, earthquake vulnerability). 
 
These databases reflect the level of public reporting which is highly disparate, being 
satisfactory only in USA and Europe. The amount of reported information is related to 
the degree of national regulation requirements for reporting incidents. According to the 
European Union SEVESO II Directive [12], the National authorities should report to the 
Commission major accidents involving toxic and dangerous substances. Since 1984, 
industrial incidents have been collected in the Major Accident Reporting System [13], 
operated by the Major Accident Hazard Bureau (MAHB), and placed at European 
Commission Joint Research Centre in Ispra (Italy). However, incidents related to 
mining activities were only included since 2003, following the amended Directive 
2003/105/EC [14]. Therefore, the official European database on historical mine 
incidents contains scarce information, which must be completed from the existing 
databases, published papers and reports.  
 
In this paper, a detailed search and re-evaluation of the known historic cases of 
tailings dam failure in Europe and the World was carried out, in the scope of an EU 
project (e-EcoRisk – A Regional Enterprise Network Decision-Support System for 
Environmental Risk and Disaster Management of Large-Scale Industrial Spills – 
Contract Nº EVG1-CT-2002-00068). The main objective of the study is to improve the 
understanding of tailings dam incident distribution, and to establish relationships and 
trends based on (known) historical tailings dam failures in Europe, as compared with 
the World’s failure cases. Simple statistical representations and Correspondence 
Analysis were used to relate dam characteristics, failure causes and types of disasters 
that occurred in four groups of countries classified according to their environmental 





2.1 Data Base Construction   
The e-EcoRisk database was fed with all available records, after a process of 
revision, cross-checking and information updating, using in first place bibliographic 
sources. In this process, a detailed literature review was conducted to gather as much 
information as possible. New data were added and information gaps were completed on 
the grounds of a detailed scrutiny of a number of journals, conference proceedings, 
reports, published and unpublished dissertations and web pages 
[15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29, among others]. Also the compilation of 
data from different European countries was achieved through the collaboration of the e-
EcoRisk partners. As a result, 147 cases of tailings dam failures in the world were 
identified, 26 of them in Europe. For each case compiled, as much information as 
possible was extracted and documented, despite the above mentioned difficulties in 
public consultation. 
For each one of the reported cases, a data form was filled including the most 
relevant information related to the tailings dam, the accident and its consequences. The 
layout of the data form was divided into six sections or tables, containing the principal 
characteristics of the dam and the accident: dam location, tailings dam characteristics, 
tailings dam failure, sludge characteristics, impacted area – socioeconomical 
consequences and impacted area – environmental consequences.  
To perform the statistical analysis seven qualitative and quantitative variables were 
selected from the database: dam type (dam, ring-dyke impoundments, water retention 
and others), type of sequentially raised tailings dam (upstream, downstream, centreline 
and non reported), state of activity (active, inactive but maintenance and abandoned), 
storage volume (# 370 000 m3, 370 000 to 2 000 000 m3 and > 2 000 000 m3), tailings 
dam height (#15m, 15-30 m and >30m), failure causes (management operations, 
seismic liquefaction, rise of the phreatic surface, mass movement/slope instability, 
fluvial undermining, inadequate/insufficient beach or free board, piping/seepage, dam 
overtopping/overflow, foundation failure, water level rise, snow melt, inadequate decant 
pipe construction, unusual rainfall event/period, insufficient perviousness of filter drain, 
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mine subsidence and others.) and type of failure (breach, hole, overtopping/overflow 
and others). 
 
2.2 Correspondence Analysis Application 
From the above described data base, a set of 7 contingency tables was extracted, 
relating 4 groups of countries (Europe (26 cases), USA (57 cases), other countries with 
developed environmental laws at the moment of the failure (e.g., Canada, Japan) – 
WPD – (14 cases), and the rest of the world – WNPD – (50 cases)) with the available 
common attributes, that characterise each breakage case. Such attributes are in general 
qualitative variables (type of dam, failures causes, …), divided into their modalities. 
Whenever quantitative variables are available (heigh and volume of the dam, …), those 
are split into classes, being transformed into ordinal attributes that can be treated jointly 
with qualitative variables (nominal attributes). 
In order to describe the data base in term of the most relevant associations between 
country type and disaster attributes, a Correspondence Analysis was applied to the 
above mentioned set of tables. 
This specific factorial method allows to summarize qualitative information under 
simple and straightforward graphs that are easily interpreted according to the rules given 
in [30]. The method was developed by J.P. Benzécri [31] for contingency tables and 
allows to project individuals (country groups) and variables (disaster attributes) in the 
same graph, the relevance of which is measured by the fraction of the total inertia 
assigned to each factorial plan, being the “inertia” the analogue of variance for 
qualitative variables. 
In order to select the modalities associated with each axis, the “absolute 
contribution” criterion is applied: a variable is retained for interpretation if the ratio of 









3.1  Geographical distribution of tailings dam incidents  
It is worth noting that this data base is the first attempt to put together the reported 
accidents in this matter, which can contribute to a better understanding of failure cases 
with special emphasis on the European incidents. Obviously, any effort to collect 
historical cases of tailings dam incidents would result in a very incomplete database, 
since the majority of tailings dam incidents remain unreported, especially in developing 
countries or in those countries where environmental legislation is, or has been, very lax.  
In those cases where a known accident did occur, it is often difficult to obtain basic 
information regarding the tailings dam and its condition prior to the incident (e.g. dam 
height, tailings volume, water content, etc).  
 
This lack of information affects strongly the representativeness of the data base, 
since the major part of the compiled cases is taken from a few countries. In Fig. 1 the 
distribution of tailings dam incidents by country indicates that 74% of the cases come 
from a small number of countries: USA (39%), Europe (18%), Chile (12%) and 
Philippines (5%). In Europe, out of the 26 cases compiled, 38% occurred in the UK and 
56% are distributed between 9 other countries (Bulgaria, France, Ireland, Italy, Republic 
of Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Spain and Sweden). The geographical distribution of 
the collected cases reflects the lack/abundance of information from individual countries 
and the uneven distribution of mine exploitations and corresponding tailings dams.  
 
The analyses of the distribution of the world’s tailings dam failures with regard to 
dam height (Fig. 2) show that 55.9% of the cases occurred in dams over 15 m in height 
and only 22.6% of incidents in dams higher than 30 m. The distribution is similar when 
considering only Europe, even though some differences are noticed (Fig. 2). 47.4% of 
European incidents occurred in dams over 15 m in height, whilst this figure is 43.2% for 
events elsewhere in the world. By contrast, there is a greater percentage of failures in 
dams of 15-30 m in Europe (42.1%) than in the rest of the world (31.1%). Furthermore, 
all European dam failures occurred in dams less than 45 m in height. 
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3.2  Tailings dam failure causes 
In this database, 15 different failure causes have been spotted. In many cases (39%) 
the dam breaks resulted from a combination of different factors. For example, failures 
attributed to meteorological causes (intense rainfall, hurricanes, rapid snowmelt, ice 
accumulation in the tailings dam, etc.) may also be associated with 
overflow/overtopping, seepage, foundation failure or bad impoundment management. In 
this analysis, 11 “cause of failure” categories were differentiated (see Fig. 3), and each 
incident was assigned to a single category, which contributed the most to the dam break 
according to the dam failure description. The major fraction of incidents relates to 
meteorological causes (e.g. unusual rainfall events/periods and snow), accounting for 
25% of worldwide cases and 35% in Europe. 
 
The second most important cause in Europe is related to poor management and 
inadequate human activities at the tailings dam sites. Deficient management practice 
accounted for 10% of worldwide incidents and 12% of European cases. This category 
includes the following specific causes: poor beach management; faulty maintenance of 
the dam drainage structures, inappropriate dam procedures (e.g. rapid dam growth, 
presence of heavy machinery in unstable dams). It is likely that the correct application 
of basic safety regulations would have prevented the accidents.  
 
The following most common cause of dam break in Europe is related to failures of 
the dam foundations and, in most of the reported cases, this was due to a poor choice of 
dam placement and dam construction, accounting for 12% of European cases and 6% of 
all cases registered globally. Other causes that correspond to a greater number of events 
in Europe than in the rest of the world are seepage/piping, overtopping and mine 
subsidence accounting for, respectively, 8%, 8% and 8% in Europe, against 7%, 6% and 
2% globally. The higher frequency of these types of failures in Europe, along with 
meteorological causes and poor management, is a relevant finding as compared with the 
worldwide situation. It is also worth noting the lack of incidents caused by earthquakes 
(seismic liquefaction) in Europe. This cause, for the rest of the world, accounts for 14% 
of total cases.  
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3.3  Accident statistics in relation to mining activity and dam construction methods  
As soon as an impoundment has been filled or the mine production ceases, the 
tailings dam becomes inactive. In some cases the infilled pond and dam continue to be 
maintained. However, in other cases, especially when mine production ceases, the 
tailings dam may be abandoned. For this reason, the tailings dams contained in the 
database were classified according to whether they were active when the accident 
occurred (ACT), inactive but still being maintained (INM) and abandoned (AB). In 
European countries, under the present environmental legislation, inactive dams are 
currently supervised and controlled. However, in countries without an appropriate 
environmental legislation, the majority of tailings dams are abandoned. Out of the total 
number of failure cases where the activity of the dam could be determined, 83% 
occurred when the dam was active, 15% in inactive and abandoned dams and only 2% 
of failures occurred in inactive but maintained dams. In active dams, the most frequent 
cause of failure are related to natural hazards (e.g. seismic liquefaction or heavy 
rainfall), followed by management operation and structural failures. Management 
operation and slope instability are only associated with active tailings dams. In Europe, 
90% of incidents occurred in active dams and 10% in abandoned ponds. There is a lack 
of reported incidents in inactive-maintained dams.  
 
Tailings dams are usually constructed in phases as the impoundment fills. New parts 
of the embankment are built on top of the previous structure with the new dam crest 
thus moving upstream, downstream or following a centerline (see [32] for detail 
explanation). The method of dam construction that accounts for the highest number of 
incidents is associated with the upstream raised method (UPS), representing 76% of the 
cases in the World and 47% of failures in Europe (% referred to reported cases where 
available data on dam construction method exists). Downstream (DOWN) and 
centerline (CTL) raised tailings dams represent 15% and 5% of global cases, 
respectively, whereas in Europe they correspond to 40% and 6.5% of known cases.  
Dam constructed using more than one method were included under the category of 
mixed construction (MXSQ), which represents a 4% of global cases and 6.5% in 
Europe. In Fig. 4, the different construction types are presented alongside the state of 
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activity at the dam. The figure shows that the greatest number of incidents worldwide 
occurred in active dams of upstream growth type. In Europe, a similar percentage of 
dam incidents occurred in dams with upstream and downstream raised methods (47% 
and 40%, respectively). There is a twofold explanation for this feature: (1) downstream 
growth in Europe is more commonly used that elsewhere in the world, and (2) there is a 
lack of incidents related to seismic liquefaction which are known to affect especially 
dams with part of its structure lying on the tailings deposits. It is estimated that roughly 
half of the dam breaks could have been avoided with correct tailings dam construction 
(e.g. adequate site selection, correct dimensions, etc.) and appropriate management 
during its period of activity. 
 
3.4  e-EcoRisk database Correspondence Analysis 
A Correspondence Analysis was applied to the set of 7 contingency tables, which 
results are summarised in Fig. 5, accounting for 100% of the available information. 
The interpretation of Fig. 5a) is straightforward:  
- Along axis 1 (from the negative to the positive side) are sequenced the groups of 
countries according to their “development level” in what environmental regulations are 
concerned (USA, Europe, WPD and WNPD). 
- Regarding ordinal attributes, variables Dam Storage Volume (DV) and Dam 
Height (DAL) follow the same sequence (from small to big impoundments), indicating 
that the more “developed” is a country, the smaller is the dam that breaks. 
- Regarding nominal attributes, the modalities that contribute significantly to 
(USA+Europe) group, according to the above given (section 2.2) “absolute 
contribution” criterion, are the following: water retention dam type (WR), downstream 
sequentially raised dam (DOWN) and failure causes, mine subsidence (FMIN), snow 
melt (FSNW), unusual rainfall event/period (FRAIN), seepage/piping (FSEE) and slope 
instability (FCMM). Conversely, for the (WPND+WPD) group, contribute the 
following modalities: ring-dyke impoundments (RING), dam-type impoundments 
(DAM), upstream sequentially raised dam (UPS), mix sequentially raised dam (MXSQ), 
abandoned impoundment (AB), seismic liquefaction failure cause (FSLQ), other failure 
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types (FTOT), overtopping/overflow failure cause (FCOV) and overtopping/overflow 
failure type (FTOV). 
- Axis 2 is not relevant for the interpretation of the cross tabulation countries vs. 
dam and failure attributes since it opposes the two extremes (USA+WPND) to 
“intermediate” conditions (Europe+WPD) and no significant attribute modality is 
assigned to the opposition disclosed by this axis.  
- In what concerns plane 1, 3, (Fig. 5b)) gives a fair insight about the opposition 
Europe vs. WPD, when projection onto axis 3 is interpreted in terms of nominal 
attribute modalities that contribute significantly to it. In fact, Europe is associated with 
downstream (DOWN) and mix (MXSQ) raised dams, and with the following failure 
causes: FMIN, FWLR (water level rise) and FSTR (structural failure); on the other 
hand, WPD is associated with centerline (CTL) inactive but maintained dams (INM), 
slide failure cause (SLI) and with the snow melt failure cause, FSNW.  
 
4. Conclusions 
In the scope of the EC funded project e-EcoRisk, a worldwide database of historical 
tailings dam failures was collected. Most of the data compiled in the e-EcoRisk 
Database have been obtained from newspapers, technical reports, scientific papers, and 
from e-EcoRisk partners’ reports. A preliminary statistical analysis was carried out in 
order to gain knowledge on the causes of failure, vulnerable tailings dam geometries, 
and geographic distribution of incidents.  
 
Regarding to tailings dam incidents in Europe, the main conclusions are: 
- Europe (14%) is the second world zone on tailings dam incidents, only exceeded 
by the USA (43%). The largest number of accidents in Europe are located in the UK 
(56% out of 14%). 
- All the European tailings dam failures have occurred in dams of less than 45 m 
high, of which one third were in dams of 20-30 m in height.  
- The major percentage of incidents is related to meteorological causes (26% to 
unusual rainfall and 3% to snow). There is a lack of incidents due to seismic 
liquefaction, which accounts for 14% of incidents elsewhere in the world.  
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- Over 85% of the accidents occurred in active tailings dams, and only 15% of the 
incidents were related to abandoned dams. In Europe, there are not reported incidents on 
inactive-maintained tailings dams.  
- In Europe, there is an even number of reported incidents on dams with upstream 
and downstream construction methods (44% each), whereas worldwide the upstream 
growth is associated with up to 66% of the reported failures.  
- A typical incident in Europe is, therefore, related to unusual rainfall events. This 
data is relevant to the growing number of inactive mine ponds in Europe, and shows the 
great importance of appropriate dimension of the dam’s water drainage systems. 
- In regard to the comparison of failure cases by groups of countries (USA, Europe, 
WPD, WNPD), this sequence is explained by an increase of dam volume and height and 
by a transition of modalities contributing to USA+Europe (which are the Water 
Retention (Dam Type); the Mine Subsidence, the Snow Melt, the Heavy Rain, the Slope 
Instability and the Piping/Seepage (Failure Causes) and the Downstream (Type of 
Sequentially Raised Tailing Dam)) and to WPD+WPND (which are the Ring (Dam 
Type); the Abandoned (State of Activity); the Seismic Liquefaction, the 
Overtopping/Overflow (Failure Causes) and the Upstream, the Mix and the Centerline 
(Type of Sequentially Raised Tailing Dam)). 
- When Europe is compared with the WPD countries, the contrast is obviously 
smoother than the previous described sequence (in a ratio of 1:4). In any case, the 
modalities that contribute for the European “pole” are, in terms of Type of Sequentially 
Raised Tailing Dam, the Downstream and the Mix, and in terms of Failure Causes, 
Mine Subsidence, Water Level Rise and Structural Failure. For the opposite “pole” 
contribute the following modalities: Snow Melt and Slide, in Centerline and Inactive but 
with maintenance dams.  
- Common EU Directives may contain different requirements taking into account 
the different environmental and economic conditions of the European Member State. 
New regulation is needed to establish technical standards on tailings construction as 
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Figure 1. Distribution by country of the tailing dam incidents recorded in the database. 
Figure 2. Distribution of the number of incidents related to dam height. 
Figure 3. Distribution of the number of incidents according to cause in the World and in 
Europe. 
Figure 4. Distribution of the number of incidents according to type of dam construction 
and state of activity in the World (above) and in Europe (below). (UPS- Upstream; 
DOWN-Downstream; CTL-Centerline; MXSQ- Mixed construction; ACT- Dam active 
at the moment failure happened; INM and AB- Dam inactive at the moment failure 
occurred, abandoned (AB) or inactive but maintained (INM). 
Figure 5. Projection of attributes and groups of countries onto the first and second plane 
of Correspondence Analysis. 
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